

# **OAU/IBAR**

## **MANAGEMENT REVIEW**

**OF**

## **FITCA (K)**

**Final Report: December 2001**

***Conducted by:***

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## ACCRONYMS

DALEO	District Livestock and Agriculture Extension Officer
DAO	District Agricultural Officer
DC	District Commissioner
DDO	District Development Officer
DFO	District Forestry Officer
DLCC	District Livestock Coordinating Committee
DLPO	District Livestock Production Officer
DVO	District Veterinary Officer
DVS	Directorate of Veterinary services
EU	European Union
FITCA	Farming in Tsetse Controlled Areas
GOK	Government of Kenya
HRD	Human Resources Development
IBAR	Intra African Bureau for Animal Resources
ICIPE	International Centre For Insect Physiology And Ecology
ILRI	International Livestock Research Institute
KETRI	Kenya Trypanosomiasis Research Institute
LDP	Kenya Finland Livestock Development Project
LPO	Livestock Production Officer
MOARD	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NALEP	National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Project
OAU	Organization of Africa Unity

PM	Project Manager
PMU	Project Management Unit
WP&CE	Work Plan and Cost Estimate

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Objectives, Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

### **Objective**

- 0.1. The objective of this assignment was to try and identify what had caused the deterioration in relationships between the project and the national institutions on the one hand, the internal problems related to local staff employed in the project on the other and recommend measures that would improve and speed up overall project implementation for the benefit of the communities in the region.

### **Findings**

- F.1. An organizational structure for implementing project activities had not been developed. Staff roles were not clearly defined and reporting lines were not specified. In addition, composition of senior project management team was biased in favour of technical excellence at the expense of the other skills necessary for effective project management.
- F.2. Administrative and personnel policies and procedures (reporting, out-of-pocket allowances, transport etc) had not been formulated. Staff are under two different types of contracts—that of “administrative order” and the “work plan and cost estimate” order. Staff employed under the administrative order are comparatively better paid. In general, staff under both orders were relatively less well paid compared to staff in similar OAU/IBAR projects. Besides the nature and scope of staff contracts, comparatively “poor” salaries and lack of policies had caused job insecurity and contributed to low morale among some staff.
- F.3. Internal and external communications were not well developed. Local politicians and provincial administration did not have adequate information about project activities.
- F.5. Although KETRI has previously carried out work for the project, relations had deteriorated to an extent where KETRI could no longer participate in FITCA(K) activities. Without apportioning blame, it was apparent that both FITCA(K) and KETRI were responsible for this breakdown in communication. Although the DVS is the acknowledged entry point for project activities in the ministry, it did not give adequate support to the project. Indeed, in Nyanza province it was reported that a DVS/ GoK budgetary allocation for monitoring tsetse related activities did not exist.
- F.6. Staff of the MOARD and other GoK staff based at the district (including those from KETRI) were happy with the project goal and objectives. They were willing to continue collaborating with the project. But staff of the MOARD is unhappy with the field allowances and the level of logistical facilitation provided by the project.

- F.7. Although participatory planning for project activities was conducted together with the stakeholders, implementation was frequently not done according to plans. Stakeholders were not given regular feedback on the status of planned activities and sometimes staff were not given advance notice to prepare for implementation of activities.
- F.8. The project's innovative efforts to involve the private sector in addressing the sustainability of the project are commendable. However, the DVS needs to ensure that district based staff do not sabotage some of the interventions. There is scope for more networking and collaboration of FITCA (K) with other projects and institutions in a number of areas in order to avoid "re-inventing the wheel".
- F.9. The PMU had displayed little trust for staff of the MOARD personnel working on the project. Accorded more trust, however, they could be more useful to the project -especially in subject matter areas where they had demonstrated experience.
- F.10. The role of RDI/ Stockwatch in the PMU was not clear. However, their influence in some decisions made by project management was seen by a number of stakeholders as interfering with stakeholder relationships and giving the project bad publicity. The OAU/IBAR did not take active role in project management.
- F.11. The project has excellent technical capacity for the design of tsetse control and livestock management interventions. It has initiated innovative tsetse control activities, and project beneficiaries are enthusiastic about them. However, more activities need to be implemented to sustain beneficiary interest. Although beneficiaries are satisfied with ongoing tsetse control and rural development activities, they are unhappy with some aspects of project implementation.

## **Conclusions**

- C1. None of the problems being faced by the project is insurmountable. What is required is a desire and commitment by the main stakeholders, namely KETRI and the DVS to consciously contribute to the rural development of the communities in the project area. A new sense of purpose by all parties concerned is required. In particular, re-focusing on the achievement of project objectives instead of preoccupation with issues of project ownership and the control of financial resources by all stakeholders is required.
- C2. The natures of the project design and the financing agreement have previously caused confusion among some important stakeholders of the MOARD making implementation in collaboration with KETRI and the DVS especially, rather difficult. However, during the debriefing of this assignment held in the boardroom of OAU/IBAR, the EU Rural Development Advisor clarified many of the issues in the financing agreement causing confusion to KETRI and the

DVS. It is hoped that this clarification will now engender greater cooperation with staff of these departments/institutions.

- C3. Without cooperation from the MOARD, it is estimated that *other things being equal*, implementation of project activities could be delayed by up-to 2 years. This would significantly reduce beneficiary interest and support for the project implementation.
- C4. Some of the problems faced by the project could be traced back to the organizational structure of the PMU. While an organizational structure in itself is no panacea for solving organizational problems, by allocating tasks, clarifying roles and allocating responsibilities, it improves staff and project performance, *ceteris paribus*. Lack of a clearly understood structure has given rise to a situation in which dismissed staff have not been replaced, existing staff do not know the boundaries within which they should perform their jobs, whom to report to etc. Consequently staff have demonstrated little motivation to take initiative on project issues.
- C5. The differences in the nature of the contracts are a major source of job insecurity among some members of staff. In addition, the significant differences in salaries paid to project staff vis-à-vis those paid to comparable staff in similar projects of the OAU/IBAR is a major contributor to low staff morale.
- C6. Senior project management team is acknowledged as having excellent technical capacity to design innovative tsetse control/animal production interventions. That said, the task of project management goes beyond technical excellence to include planning, organizing, leading, communicating and controlling. All members of the PMU did not internalize project vision and strategy. Lack of a proper project management structure has led to a situation in which delegation of tasks is ineffective and coordination of intervention initiatives is inadequate-leading to slow progress in implementation of some important intervention areas.
- C7. The role of RDI/Stockwatch in project management, especially the communication, organization and control aspects may have more negative impact in project relationships with key stakeholders than previously acknowledged. The absence of a consistent communications strategy and /or clear mechanisms for stakeholder communications was a major source of the many problems affecting the project.
- C8. Personnel in the districts expressed willingness to cooperate with the project in implementation. What they needed was a demonstration from their superiors in Nairobi that the GoK was committed to cooperate with this as well as other projects in assisting communities in the project area. Demonstration of mistrust for their integrity and technical capacity by the PMU, *even if justified*, is bad public relations for the project and can only reduce their willingness to collaborate beyond the call of duty. Allowances paid to field staff, especially

those from KETRI were considered inadequate raising the question the of FITCA 's seriousness to work with them on the project.

- C9. Project management must also make a commitment to achieve project objectives by strengthening the human capacity required to implement the project. The project is already behind schedule in a number of key result areas. Lack of team capacity and spirit has a bearing on the speed of implementation of project activities. Moreover, it is unrealistic to expect the few staff on long term contracts to effectively coordinate implementation in five districts.
- C10. The policy of the project to classify otherwise public information as "confidential" can only increase the level of mistrust from stakeholders and fuel accusations of lack of transparency. In such circumstances, likeminded collaborators may have been encouraged to selectively pass on project information creating the kind of situation in which project activities recently became the subject of an editorial in the "Nation" newspaper.
- C11. Staff of the MOARD appreciates initiatives made in participatory planning with stakeholders. However, concerns were raised that stakeholder inputs into the activity budgetary process were not appreciated. Similar concerns were expressed regarding non-implemented planned activities. These issues were causing dissatisfaction among some staff and threatening to further reduce stakeholder support. Many commendable initiatives have been started to collaborate with the private sector and other institutions. Follow-up and coordination of these initiatives has however been slow- leading some collaborators to question the seriousness of the initiatives.
- C12. Beneficiaries were happy with the interventions provided so far. Although delayed implementation was not an issue for them, some promises made to them had not been satisfactorily met. Unless this is rectified, the high levels of beneficiary interest and support maybe reduced leading to tacit withdrawal of their support.

## **Recommendations**

- R.1. The MOARD and OAU/IBAR should enter into an MOU for the implementation of the project. The debriefing meeting indicated the need for a series of workshops with stakeholders, before drafting the MOU. However, as the main stakeholders are departments of the MOARD -and most of the relevant issues have previously been covered in the national workshops held last year, the activity planning process, if well conducted, is sufficient basis for the drafting of the MOU.
- R.2. The issue of logistical facilitation to the DVOs in project activities should be reviewed and where necessary, realistic facilitation made. To enhance co-operation, allowances paid to staff of the MOARD should be harmonized and reviewed upwards to reflect demand for their services. Feedback on project activities, especially those done in collaboration should be provided to staff of

the MOARD. In addition project management must make a conscious effort to trust the stakeholders they expect to work with. In this connection, the PMU must decide whom to trust for coordination of district activities-the DLCCs or the DVOs.

- R.3. In order to improve project management, the organization structure of the PMU should be reviewed and/ or formalized .The PMU should rationalize tasks to be performed and establish personnel and operational guidelines for staff. The PMU should develop guidelines for communication and disseminate project information to more stakeholders. An administration manager working under the PM can effectively carry out the role of facilitating daily project operations, information dissemination and stakeholder communications at the district level. In order to control the bad publicity to the project due to RDI/Stockwatch's pervasive influence in project decisions, the OAU/IBAR should play a greater supervisory role in the management of the project. This may call for a review of those aspects in the contract between RDI/Stockwatch and the EU whose implementation require involvement in project management issues.
- R.4. The participation of KETRI staff in project activities should be encouraged. The OAU/IBAR, in consultation with the Permanent Secretary, MOARD if necessary, should convene a meeting with the director of KETRI to review the known areas of disagreement with a view to amicably sorting them out. Likewise, the participation of the DVS in project activities should be promoted. DVS should communicate the directorate's support to the project to district staff in writing. Similarly, the classification of DVOs as entry points should be formalized with a view to empowering them to more effectively coordinate district FITCA activities.
- R.5. The contractual status of staff working in the project should be reviewed and regularized. Staff working on the project should have their contracts drawn by one employer--preferably OAU/IBAR. Staff salaries should be harmonized to eliminate disparities that have no objective basis. Some effort should be made to make the financial and non-financial rewards paid to staff comparable to those paid to nationals in similar projects.
- R.6. To enhance communication with stakeholders, information regarding project activities should be disseminated to a wider list of stakeholders. In the short-term, and until such time as the project has internal technical capacity for public relations, OAU/IBAR should take charge of communications with external stakeholders.
- R.7. The professional capacity of the PMU to implement activities in 5 districts should be increased. A job analysis based on the project document would identify the necessary job categories. If funds for the recruitment of suitably qualified staff are not forthcoming, the project should liaise with the Permanent Secretary, MOARD to work out modalities of seconding appropriately qualified staff from the GoK to the PMU.

R.8. In order to improve the operating environment, the PM should make more use of existing local and regional networks. To improve overall communications, key staff together with important stakeholders should be encouraged to brush up their management skills by attending courses on project management.

## 1.0. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

*Burundi*

The Kenya component of the "Farming in Tsetse Control Areas" (FITCA) is part of a regional program for 6 East African countries namely Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Sudan. The overall objective of the Kenya component is to improve the welfare of the people in the region through sustainable rural development. It is envisioned that improved animal health, management and nutrition and the gradual upgrading of the indigenous stock will lead to an increase in livestock products and hence livestock productivity.

The program is not a classical tsetse and trypanosomiasis control project but a rural development program with emphasis on livestock improvement. The areas of implementation are five Districts in Western Kenya; Bungoma, Teso, Busia, Bondo and Siaya, bordering Uganda. The area is densely populated such that no new land will be opened up but the productivity of the existing systems will be improved. An important feature of the program is the involvement of the local communities, which will be enabled to continue tsetse and trypanosomiasis control after the end of the project through increased income from livestock and cash crops.

The design envisaged the collaboration and substantive involvement of the various government departments, NGOs, CBOs, and farmers, in the implementation process. This design resulted in extensive confusion and acrimony related to project ownership and resources control, among the stakeholders, during the first year of implementation. Consequently, little was achieved on the ground during this period.

The European Union funds the FITCA program. The Director of OAU/IBAR is the Regional Authorizing Officer (RAO) for the Regional Component of FITCA and he acts also as National Authorizing Officer (NAO) for FITCA Kenya. This component is the only FITCA country project that is directly under the responsibility of the RAO, which means that the project is implemented through the OAU/IBAR office in Nairobi. A Project Management Unit (PMU) based in Busia manages the activities of the project. This constellation of organizations results in difficulties of identification of the national authorities to associate them with the project.

The project had a slow start with implementation, partly because of problems experienced with the first Technical Assistant (TA). Another reason appears to be poor working relationships between FITCA (K) and major stakeholders in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MOARD).

Over the last 5-10 years the Kenya government has suffered serious financial constraints, leading to drastic reductions in disbursement of funds to MOARD. Consequently, the activities of the public agricultural sector in Western Kenya have virtually stopped. A key assumption in the financing agreement for the FITCA Kenya project was that the veterinary department would sustain tsetse control activities. However, when the project commenced the expectation of both politicians and technical staff from MOARD seemed to be that the project

would assume the role of the Government of Kenya (GoK) and maintain and finance tsetse control activities.

The resulting misunderstanding led to disillusionment of various partners and raised questions about resources, project ownership and what FITCA Kenya should or could do. It had been hoped that GoK would increase funds to enable veterinary staff to work with the project.

A series of stakeholder workshops in which the roles of various stakeholders was clarified were held last year, 2001. A new technical assistant whose mandate was to speed up the project implementation was also recruited last year. In spite of these efforts, the relationship with some GoK partners has continued to be unsatisfactory and in some cases actually deteriorated. At the same time, problems have cropped up with locally recruited staff.

***(NB: In this document, the terms “project management” and “PMU” are used interchangeably. So are the “DVS” and Department Of Veterinary Services)***

## **2.0. OBJECTIVE OF THE CONSULTANCY ASSIGNMENT**

The objective of the consultancy was to provide, in keeping with EU procedures, main recommendations on modalities for project implementation in order to reach active collaboration between the institutions concerned so as to benefit the population.

### **2.1 Limitations of the Assignment**

FITCA(K) Project management expressed reservations about the scope of the Terms of Reference (TORs) and the timing of the assignment. They had prepared a different set of TORs for this assignment. The focus of these TORs was the broader contextual issues in the project cycle such as design and not project implementation. Those issues are best left for the MTR to address and are substantially different from the focal issues in this assignment. *(Both sets of TORs are attached as annexes).*

The consultant started the information gathering process before having an opportunity to familiarize himself with the project documents. Although Project Management was responsible for drawing up the consultant's itinerary *(including the collaborators and persons to be visited)*, the Project Manager was unavailable for most of the period in which the consultant was in the project area. Consequently, the consultant did not have sufficient time to clarify some of the issues with him. While the possibility that a longer period of interaction with the PM would have enriched the study findings does exist, the fact that verification of many issues could only be done by one individual was indicative of the limitations inherent in the structure of the PMU. To the extent possible, the contents of project literature availed to the consultant were analyzed for insights/clarifications.

Furthermore, it was difficult to verify some of the reports, especially those pertaining to dismissals, as those concerned were not available for the interviews. Attempts to clarify issues with some stakeholders were fruitless. There was a deliberate reluctance by RDI/Stockwatch to shed light on issues concerning staff, which made the consultant's task of making informed conclusions more difficult. In spite of these limitations however, it is the consultant's considered opinion that the conclusions reached would not have been substantially different from those in the current report. This report should therefore be read with that background in mind.

## **2.2 Structure of the Report.**

The report begins with an introductory chapter. This chapter gives background information on the project to date. Chapter two gives the objectives of the consultancy assignment and outlines problems encountered in executing the assignment. Chapter three gives an outline of the method used to gather information during the assignment. Chapter four gives detailed findings of the institutions and organizations visited. Chapter five gives conclusions from the findings while chapter six gives recommendations on a possible way forward in addressing significant shortcomings.

## **3.0 METHODOLOGY**

The assignment was conducted using a combination of project literature reviews and discussions with key stakeholders. The consultant was able to review project reports and correspondence between Project Management and some of its key stakeholders. At the national level, senior staff of KETRI and the Directorate of Veterinary Services were interviewed. Staff of collaborating research institutions were also interviewed. Senior staff of the implementing agency, the OAU/IBAR and FITCA (Regional) were also interviewed. The regional representative of the consulting firm Stockwatch/RDI was also interviewed as were senior staff of collaborating institutions and private sector organizations.

At the district level, the DVOs and other officers of the Ministry were interviewed. In all the districts, interviews/discussions with these officers were held in group settings. Courtesy calls were made to the District Officers. Staff of a locally based NGO with activities in the project area were also interviewed. Selected staff of the project in Busia and Nairobi were also interviewed. Although the issues to be studied did not require interviewing the beneficiaries, adhoc discussions were held with a few farmers in Busia and Teso districts. Staff who also had livestock farming interests provided further insight.

Wherever possible an attempt was made to verify the views reported. However, as the study progressed, it became increasingly clear that some important stakeholders were determined not to divulge information to the consultant. The consultant had therefore to decide on the credibility or

otherwise of the information provided by the respondents. (*A list of persons interviewed is attached as Annex 3*).

## 4.0 FINDINGS

### 4.1 Relationships With National Authorities

#### 4.1.1 Relationship With KETRI

The mandate of KETRI is “...to carry out research into all aspects that would eventually lead to the effective control of human and animal trypanosomiasis and effective reclamation of tsetse infested lands...”

There was still some measure of confusion within KETRI about the project’s mandate and the role of KETRI in its implementation. While KETRI’s understanding was that funds allocated for research in a “National” project should be given to them, instead FITCA (K) subjected them to a competitive tendering process. Competing for research funds and work with international organizations that had superior technical capacity “denied” them opportunities for staff/capacity development.

In the project document, *“FITCA, Kenya Programme” (Implementation details)*, a budget line for traveling and allowances was earmarked for the KETRI Director. At the time of this assignment, none of this money had been disbursed to the Institute. In the same document, the role outlined for KETRI was much bigger than what it currently is. Being a national institution, KETRI was also of the opinion that the OAU/IBAR had no mandate to supervise its research work. Moreover, they were convinced that they had the technical capacity to implement the FITCA project. They contended that the current implementation was at variance with the provisions made in the project document cited above and hoped that the mid-term review would be able to address this and other anomalies in the project implementation and design.

Sometime back, KETRI undertook survey work for the project. According to KETRI, some aspects of the survey were subcontracted to an independent consultant who was required to submit his findings for inclusion in the report. However, “shortcomings” were reportedly identified in the results of the survey work as a result of which they were not fully paid for the assignment. According to KETRI however, they had successfully completed their component but the independent consultant had to leave the country in a hurry and was therefore unable to complete his section. Accordingly, although KETRI has since been identified by FITCA (K) to conduct a livestock study for them, they were unable to agree on the amount of field allowance to be paid to participating staff. As a result KETRI declined to conduct the study. The study has not been done to date – almost one year later!

Staff at the Alupe station in Busia had instructions not to work for FITCA (K). Nevertheless, they expressed willingness to work with the project if the daily allowance was raised to at least the daily rate of KShs 400/- paid to them while on KETRI assignments. FITCA (K) wanted to pay them KShs 350/- per day.)

Although senior management of the OAU/IBAR had reportedly made every effort to persuade the director of KETRI to continue collaboration with the project, these efforts had not been successful.

#### **4.1.2 Directorate of Veterinary Services.**

Misunderstanding about the mandate of the project and the role of the DVS in its implementation was also detected here. The role of the department as entry point for the project in the Ministry of Agriculture and what it entailed appeared to have been misinterpreted. In addition, as the project was a result of the 15<sup>th</sup> harmonization meeting, in which the directorate was actively involved, DVS was dissatisfied with the *modus operandi* of the financing agreement as they had been led to believe that they would implement the project arising from these meetings. (In some countries, the FITCA project was implemented by government departments as are many other funded projects in Kenya).

Staff of the DVS were involved in gathering data and drafting the “original” proposal document. The project document contains a number of capacity building initiatives to be implemented by the department. These included rehabilitation of vehicles, allowances for travel and so on. Even though funds had been allocated for them, FITCA(K) had been reluctant to release the funds to the department. DVS expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which the project provided them with information on project activities.

The Department also expressed dissatisfaction with the current structure of the PMU. They felt that there was need to have a member of staff of the MOARD in the PMU to assume the role of “contact point”. A National Project Coordinator to act as liaison between the project and Government departments has recently been appointed. *One hopes that the coordinator will also fulfill this role of “contact point” suggested by the DVS since the project can only realistically incorporate into the PMU persons that can add value to project implementation.*

The department also expressed concern that project sustainability issues had not been adequately addressed in the implementation. In their view, the best way to build sustainability into project implementation was to include the training of MOARD personnel alongside that of beneficiaries and private sector entrepreneurs.

In Nyanza province, the provincial zoologist reported that no budgetary allocation had been made by GOK to monitor tsetse related activities .

#### **4.2 Staff of the MOARD and other GoK Staff at the District**

District Commissioners, District Development Officers and staff of the MOARD expressed a willingness to collaborate in the implementation of the project. Most acknowledged that the project goal was noble and that achievement of the main objectives would empower the beneficiaries to sustainably control the tsetse menace. As one DVO put it “...before project activities started, farmers reported cases of cattle disease to my office. I was not able to effectively

*assist them. Since project activities began, they no longer bother me with such problems and my work has in fact been made easier..."*

The major bone of contention from the MOARD staff was the apparent "mistrust" displayed towards them by the PMU, the lack of "genuine" consultation regarding project activities and the lack of sufficient logistical support for implementation of project activities. In addition, they were unhappy with the daily allowance paid by the project of between Kshs 250/- and Kshs 350/- per day (*depending on whether they were in or outside the districts*). When the project began operating, they were paid daily allowances of Kshs 500/- each.

#### **4.2.1 Reference to DVO as Entry Point**

The DVO is recognized as the entry point for project activities. Unfortunately, this focal point lacks formal recognition. Although the DVS had not officially forbidden co-operation with FITCA on project activities, they had not encouraged staff to co-operate in the implementation thus giving staff the impression that the department was a "reluctant" partner. This had given rise to a situation in which the DVOs were reportedly occasionally reprimanded about project activities during discussions on district activities.

#### **4.2.2 Planning and Implementation of Project Activities**

District Work Plans were developed in collaboration with staff of the MOARD and other stakeholders. GOK subject matter specialists were thereafter requested by the PMU to prepare budgets for programmed activities. Staff were unhappy that plans and budgets thus prepared were adjusted by PMU without consultation. Staff of the MOARD also complained that occasionally, planned activities had been shelved without feedback being provided to those who had prepared them. PMU indicated that reviews and adjustments were necessary to ensure that only activities with value added were budgeted for. Besides, even where activities and budgets had mutually been agreed upon, there was no guarantee that implementation would be carried out as planned. In other cases, personnel that had not participated in the planning has been hired to carry out the implementation. In a number of cases, new activities had been planned and executed without consultation.

Non-implementation of planned activities was a source of frustration to the officers concerned.

#### **4.2.3 Implementation of Planned Activities**

District personnel expressed willingness to co-operate with FITCA in order to achieve the main objectives of the project. In addition, they expressed satisfaction with the training activities carried out with them and the communities. They were however, unhappy with the introduction of unplanned activities in the work plan. In their view, this attitude was based on an erroneous assumption by the PMU that they did not have own work plans to

implement. They also expressed dissatisfaction with the fact the PMU did not give them adequate time to prepare for such unplanned activities.

The politicians who “introduced” the project into the area gave the communities the impression that it would solve many of their developmental problems by giving out “free” goods and services. Besides wiping out tsetse fly, the project would provide free bulls and pour on chemicals, among other things. The obvious impracticability of meeting these promises has given rise to some mistrust about the project among some community members.

During meetings with beneficiaries, staff of the PMU had insinuated that staff of the MOARD were incompetent. This lack of trust had apparently contributed to delayed implementation of some activities and raised the overall cost of implementation of some interventions. For instance, whereas the DAO has a reservoir of information on cassava, PMU staff did not consult him when they were investing in cassava activities. Similarly, although completed questionnaires used in the faecal samples and “calf rearing” components of the livestock development programme had been given to PMU sometime back, no feedback had been given to the stakeholders on the fate of this exercise.

Likewise, although staff of the MOARD in Bondo had participated in planning for cassava activities and the draught animal power activities in 2000, they were not given any feedback on implementation. It was only in late 2001, that they accidentally discovered that these components had been allocated to Lagrotech Consultants for implementation.

Because activities in work plan were not necessarily the ones implemented, some stakeholders accused the project of lacking “*transparency*”. Similarly, implementing partners felt ignored when they were not advised in time of changes to planned activities.

### **4.3 Organization For Project Implementation**

The PMU is based in Busia with a small Secretariat based at the offices of the OAU/IBAR in Nairobi. The implementation structure of the project was designed to have a small team of experts constituting the PMU. FITCA(K) presently has 14 members of staff. Professional staff in Busia comprises the Project Manager, a sociologist, an administrator cum accounts officer assisted by three drivers, a secretary and two technicians. In Nairobi, professional staff include the liaison officer, a G.I.S expert and a finance officer. A secretary and a driver assist these. The project design envisaged a situation in which most interventions would be carried out with the support of GoK staff – either as staff seconded to the project or as collaborators in the district.

An analysis of the PMU shows that it does not have a discernible organizational structure. Staff do not have clear, written functions and roles. Besides the lack of clear, well-understood job classifications, the PMU appeared to be reluctant to replace staff that had been dismissed – raising the

issue of their appropriateness in the first place. At the same time, it appeared as if the expertise required to implement some aspects of the strategy had not yet been identified. There was also some reluctance by the PMU to accept staff seconded to them by the MOARD. Correspondence between the project and the Ministry, however, suggested that the category of staff seconded to the project by the MOARD was not appropriately trained for the project.

Similarly, professional capacity in PMU was inadequate for accomplishing the project's mandate in five districts. Besides the PM, only one other professional staff in Busia was on a one-year contract. The other professional staff cadre was on three-month renewable contracts while the rest were basically project support staff.

Structures and systems to guide PMU processes such as reporting, communication, sharing of management information and conflict resolution did not exist. Internal and external channels of communication are not structured and communication with politicians and other stakeholders is generally poor. Lamented one DC *"...in the absence of the Project Manager, I do not know who to talk to."* Moreover, there was inadequate delegation of authority such that in the absence of the PM, staff were unable to effectively respond to external enquires. Furthermore, many project decisions appeared to be made outside the PMU.

The financing agreement indicates that the liaison officer would take overall responsibility for the execution of the project. In the prevailing structure, that responsibility has been allocated to the "Technical Assistant"-with the liaison officer being designated as deputy Project Manager.

#### **4.3.1. Human Resource Policies**

Except for financial management, there were insufficient policy and operational guidelines. Policies to guide recruitment and selection of project staff, dismissals, discipline, staff performance appraisal and so on did not exist. In addition, policies to guide relationships with government officials and selection and identification of beneficiaries are not clear to all project personnel.

Policies for job evaluation and classifications; administrative procedures; motivation and remuneration; staff development; salary increments; discipline; bonuses and benefits do not exist. Policies and procedures to guide management operations (e.g. those relating to the use of project vehicles, relationships with farmers and other stakeholders, out-of-pocket and reimbursable allowances) have not been clearly articulated.

Personnel have previously been recruited without undergoing a structured recruitment and selection process. However, since the arrival of the current PM, efforts have been made to streamline the process. Indeed, "Recruitment Guidelines" are being developed. A proposal to motivate employees by enrolling them in postgraduate studies as part of their work in the project is in the pipeline.

For a project designed to operate with a small “core” staff complement, staff turnover was relatively high. The first TA was dismissed after about ten months, the livestock production expert after about eleven months and the training officer after about five months.

### **Employment Contracts.**

Staff working on the project were hired under two 2 different types of contracts - the Administrative Order and the Work Plan And Cost Estimate (WPCE) Order. Contracts based on the WPCE were signed by the OAU/IBAR, while those based on of the administrative order had been signed by the Project Manager. While some categories of the WPCE contracts are up to the year 2003, Administrative order contracts were either annual or 3 months (renewable). In at least one case, it was reported that the operational contract was different from what had previously been agreed upon with project management. Contracts were short on job descriptions and had few details on enforcement and implementation or obligations and responsibilities.

### **Staff Remuneration.**

Generally, staff in both categories were relatively less well paid than their counterparts in similar OAU/IBAR projects.

Remuneration policies are probably best described as “interesting”. Salaries for staff under the WPCE order were relatively more attractive than those of staff under the Administrative Order. For instance, support staff under the WPCE order such as secretaries earned higher salaries than professional staff employed under the Administrative order *that is* staff of degree level training and several years of practical experience. The differences did not appear to be based on an objective assessment such as a job analysis. At the time of this assignment, staff recruited under the Administrative order contracts were expecting to receive an increment of 10% by end of the year.

### **Staff Retention.**

Project operations began in 1999. However, the first Technical Assistant (*read Project Manager*) was dismissed after working for less than a year; the livestock production manager was also dismissed after working for less than a year while the training manager was dismissed after working for about half a year. According to staff interviewed, these employees were given “instant” dismissals. Although most of these dismissals happened before the arrival of the current PM, they nevertheless gave rise to speculation about the reasons behind the dismissals. They created a fair amount of job insecurity among staff.

***(For the record, it must be pointed out that it was not possible to verify these reports with the persons concerned).***

## **Stakeholder Communications**

In communicating with external stakeholders- especially from the GoK, staff of the PMU did not follow “established” protocol. For whatever reason, they communicated with government departments and other stakeholders without going through the implementing agency. A EU/OAU delegation was hosted in the project area by the project without greater involvement of government officials. This had not gone down well with the GoK staff.

Project implementation is behind schedule in a number of key result areas. It is therefore understandable that senior staff of the PMU would wish to get things done immediately. In the prevailing political circumstances, however, such seemingly “harmless” breach of protocol may put the future of the entire project in jeopardy.

Discussions held with stakeholders by senior staff of the PMU were not documented. This made it difficult for other members of the PMU to effectively follow up discussions in their absence.

### **4.3.2. Leadership And Management**

Stakeholders acknowledge that senior staff of the PMU have the necessary experience to design appropriate tsetse control interventions. They have clear vision and strategy for implementing project interventions. PM has overall responsibility to provide technical and managerial guidance in project implementation issues. However, indications are that some of the “soft” skills required to provide effective guidance on administrative and management issues are not being fully utilized. As a result, the input of other professionals on project matters is not been taken seriously. In any case, the organizational structure for implementing the strategy is not well developed and the optimal staff capacity for strategy implementation does not appear to have been determined.

## **4.4. Collaboration With Existing Projects**

According to some of the DC’s interviewed, the project was not making full use of existing networks to implement activities. Although the DCs indicated that they knew of the project’s goals and objectives through the DVO’s, they had little information about its activities. They nevertheless indicated their full support to the project objectives.

The project area has a number of other projects and NGOs involved in development activities. As part of the strategy to build in sustainability through collaboration with the private sector, the project has initiated collaborative efforts with these projects as well as private sector enterprises with activities similar to those in the project mandate. Some of these projects/enterprises and their areas of collaboration and experience with FITCA(K) are listed below.

## **Livestock Development Programme**

Having its head office in Kisumu, the Livestock Development Programme (LDP) is a Finnish funded livestock development project. It operates in Western, Nyanza and Rift Valley Provinces. Primarily focused on improving the dairy stock through a gradual upgrading process, it is implemented through the MOARD. Their focal entry point in the Ministry was the Department of Livestock Production. This department had given the project management a lot of support in project implementation.

FITCA(K) is represented in LDP's District Livestock Coordinating Committees (DLCCs). However, FITCA(K) rarely consulted with them when planning and implementing their activities. For instance, although LDP had several years of experience in the procurement of bulls and other animals, the PMU made no effort to seek their assistance when procuring animals for the farmers. Consequently, the farmers perceived the animals they purchased as of "inferior" quality.

LDP is also doing data management for the project. The LDP has a number of activities in which they are willing to cooperate with the project. These include the following:

- tsetse-fly component and
- micro -finance activities.

According to the district project coordinators, collaboration would be further improved if FITCA were to deal directly with them instead of through the DVO.

## **ILRI**

The institute has the infrastructure and skills base to collaborate with the project on a number of issues. The Institute and FITCA (Regional) are collaborating on a number of project related issues. However, initiatives made with FITCA(K) to collaborate in the design of surveys, databases and G.I.S training were suddenly stopped and no explanation was given to the collaborating scientists.

## **Lagrotech Consultants**

Lagrotech is an integrated Agribusiness company with its Headquarters in Kisumu city. The company develops and sells improved seed varieties and provides agribusiness development support to local institutions. FITCA(K) has contracted them to collaborate on a number of activities such as the provision of draught animal technology and improved cassava varieties. So far they satisfied with the collaboration.

## **Kambu Investments**

Kambu investments are an assorted equipment and tools trading company based in Kisumu. It has been approached by FITCA (K) to carry out some work related to tsetse fly traps. However, since the initial contact was made, some time has gone by without feedback.

## **HighChem**

This is a diversified transnational pharmaceutical firm dealing with Agricultural, pharmaceutical and animal health products. They are co-operating on a range of tsetse and other disease control interventions. These include training farmers and veterinary personnel in animal husbandry and the handling and use of their tsetse control products. They have no problems with the project.

## **ICIPE**

ICIPE is an international centre of excellence for research in insect sciences. FITCA (Regional) has subcontracted them to develop M+E methodologies for the project. Although they are still in the early stages of this assignment, they reported satisfactory progress.

### **4.5 Relationship With Private Veterinarians**

A major focus of the Livestock development intervention strategy is to sustain project activities by working with private veterinarians. Private Veterinarians have been selected to work in the 5 operational districts. However, although initial contact with them was made about a year ago, they have yet to begin work with the project. They have however recently attended a refresher course on disease diagnostics.

### **4.6 Relationship With Beneficiaries.**

The few farmers interviewed expressed satisfaction with the tsetse control activities currently being undertaken. Activities in which they had participated included zero grazing units, cassava development, target traps and poultry vaccination. Some of the promises made to the farmers were not being fully met. For instance, although the first Project Manager had promised the Friesian/Ayshire breed of animals farmers, what they finally received was a crossbreed of Ayshire/Orma animals. Similarly, although animal health attendants had been promised poultry vaccination as motivation for their efforts, they had not received them by the time of this review. They also expressed ignorance about the selection criteria used by the project to select farmers to participate in some of the project activities.

Participants in FITCA (K) training programmes did not receive any refreshment or financial incentives of any type. Other projects in the area such as NALEP/SIDA gave some form of incentive to participants. Although this had initially led to some suspicion about the project, beneficiaries are beginning to

understand that financial expenditure should be concentrated on project activities and not participation in trainings.

## 5.0 CONCLUSIONS

### 5.1. Project Design Issues

Based on the Logical framework matrix, the project document has significant design problems. Although these are probably best left for the MTR to address, the mix-up of outputs and activities in the Logframe may make impact assessment difficult. Design problems are further complicated by the nature of the financing agreement – which, because it vests implementation to an agency outside mainstream government, creates conflict around ownership of resources. Problems of ownership are further compounded by the fact that some staff members based in collaborating institutions *viz* KETRI and the DVS participated in the discussions that culminated in the project proposal document and eventually the financing agreement document.

It would appear that at this point in the process, these institutions believed that they would implement the project or play a much greater role in the project than is currently the case. This misunderstanding and/ or misinterpretation of the project document and or financing agreement by these key collaborating institutions is clearly a major bone of contention – and a major contributor to the problems being faced by the project.

#### 5.1.1. Project Goal And Intervention Strategy

The project's overall goal of improving the welfare of the people in the region is widely accepted by stakeholders as noble. However, some stakeholders had difficulty accepting some of the intervention strategies proposed for achieving the goal. For instance, reports from Bungoma district indicated that the DVO was reluctant to support the envisaged role of private veterinarians in the project. Similarly, the DVS was unhappy with capacity building initiatives solely directed at the beneficiaries.

Sustainability of tsetse-fly infestation activities after completion of the project is certainly an important aspect of the project design. However, rather than increase, the implementation role in a reformed civil service structure is likely to diminish. It is more than likely that only the facilitative role will remain. DVS will therefore have a limited role in sustaining project achievements. The strategy of involving the private sector/beneficiaries should therefore be encouraged and supported by all serious stakeholders.

#### 5.1.2. Financing Agreement, Project Proposal

The programme document, *FITCA, Kenya Programme (Implementation details)* enumerates various roles for KETRI and the DVS. During the debriefing meeting for this assignment, held in the boardroom of OAU/IBAR, the project consultant RDI/Stockwatch stated that the document was not the basis of the financing agreement and should not therefore be used by KETRI and the DVS to make demands on the project.

Since activities (and budget lines) were generated from the work plan and cost estimate, the project consultant indicated that it was not possible to finance activities that were not included in it. Comments made on the draft report however, give the impression that the document cited above was the one used as basis for preparing the financing agreement. In light of this conflicting information, it was difficult to verify the correct position. However, if the latter situation were correct, and in the absence of another explanation, the DVS and KETRI would appear to have legitimate grounds for making some of the demands that they make of the Project.

The interpretation of the financing agreement and the project proposal document has been a major bone of contention between the main collaborating institutions of KETRI and the DVS. During the debriefing of this assignment however, the EU Rural Development Advisor clarified the main issues they had raised about the financing agreement. It is hoped that this clarification will now engender greater cooperation with staff of these Institutions.

Lack of cooperation from the MOARD could have disastrous effects for implementation of project activities. Based on the experience with project implementation so far, it is possible that lack of effective collaboration with KETRI and the DVS in particular could push back the implementation schedule by as many as 2 years. This would significantly reduce beneficiary interest and support for project activities.

## **5.2 Structure of the PMU**

While an organizational structure in itself is no panacea for solving organizational problems, some of the problems faced by the project can be traced back to the structure of the PMU. By allocating tasks, clarifying roles and allocating responsibilities, a well understood organizational structure improves staff and project performance, *ceteris paribus*.

Collaborating institutions acknowledges that key staff in the PMU have excellent technical capacity to design innovative tsetse control and animal production interventions. That said, the task of project management goes beyond technical excellence to include planning, organizing, leading, communicating and controlling. There is a sense in which the PMU appears to be unable or reluctant to carry out some of these aspects of project management-especially organization, communications and managerial control. Indeed the problems between KETRI and the PMU arise from a combination of personal and official differences of opinion - differences which can and should be solved by creative use of communication techniques.

The reality of the PMU is that it does not function effectively. As currently constituted, it only has two “full-time” professional staff in Busia, the headquarters of the project area. As per the Project design, professional staff based in Nairobi are also members of the PMU. With a staff complement of two persons, there may be no immediate need to formalize roles, consultations and the decision-making process. However, in the situation under review, there were reports that in a number of cases, the PM did not consider the input of staff members in making project discussions -and that many of the decisions implemented were often different from those agreed upon in meetings convened by the PMU. This led staff to conclude that their opinions were irrelevant in the project decision-making process or that decisions were being made outside of the PMU. Although not a problem with staff on short-term contracts, it was demoralizing to longer serving members of staff.

As the implementing agency, it would be expected that the OAU/IBAR would play a greater supervisory role in project implementation. It was apparent however, that it was content with providing routine supervisory inputs. It is not unreasonable to assume that this has created a void which RDI/Stockwatch has taken up and is thus seen to have more influence in decisions of the PMU than originally intended. Consequently, some personnel decisions made by the PMU have, in retrospect, ended up being an embarrassment to the OAU/IBAR.

There was a discernible reluctance by the Technical Assistance provider, RDI/Stockwatch to take decisions that were necessary to speed up project implementation if they had a financial implication. Instead, the *financial liability clause* in the contract between RDI/Stockwatch and the EU on the one hand and EU financing procedures on the other were blamed for the inaction. These are project design issues, which are probably best handled by the forthcoming MTR. Nevertheless, their impact on the effectiveness of the PMU should not be ignored.

### **5.2.1 Project Leadership And Management.**

Senior members of the PMU are acknowledged as having excellent technical leadership in the broad area of tsetse control. Indeed within a result oriented implementation environment, the reluctance to make use of communications skills might be more than compensated by technical excellence. Unfortunately, although the public service is being structured to reflect modern thinking in public service management, it has yet to adopt a performance orientation in service delivery. Rather, staff are still pre-occupied with regulations, procedures and controls. Due to the non-convergence of such objectives with effective project management, personnel with a performance orientation in service delivery would find working with and through them a frustrating experience. One may be forgiven for perceiving the niceties of bureaucratic posturing by staff of GoK as a “waste of time”. In many ways, this posturing leads to delays in decision making on project activities, which subsequently contributes to delays in implementation. Unfortunately, as long as implementation of project activities requires working within the Kenyan public

service environment, this posturing is inevitable. It is therefore important that those who have to work with them develop patience and tolerance for bureaucrats. Unfortunately, within the current structure of the civil service, a possible alternative to bureaucratic hurdles may not be readily available. Consequently, there may be need to understand that constraints encountered from GoK personnel as they further their bureaucratic objectives are not necessarily personal and hence devise creative ways of reducing their impact on implementation schedules.

Senior staff of the PMU have a clear vision and strategy of what the project needs to do and accomplish in order to help communities in the project area sustainably manage the tsetse menace. Effective leadership however, demands that this vision and strategy be well communicated, understood and shared by all members of the PMU. It is easier to delegate to staff that share and internalize the same vision, objectives, strategy and values than those who do not. Similarly, good communication and listening skills are considered essential for effective project leadership. For this reason, staff must have confidence that the PM will listen to their problems and empathize with them. If project staff feel ignored, they will be forced to seek solutions to their problems elsewhere. For similar reasons, stakeholders may withdraw their goodwill and support for the project.

Unfortunately, the current structure of the PMU does not engender teamwork. Staff do not have a common vision for the project and cannot identify with the implementation strategy. This further reduces the scope for delegation of project management tasks. Consequently, senior staff of the PMU find that they have too much work to do, there is insufficient coordination of project activities and planned activities are still behind schedule.

### **5.2.2 Project management**

RDI/Stockwatch is in charge of hiring the TA, some categories of local staff and local “consultants”. The relationship between RDI/Stockwatch, some local consultants, institutions and staff is not good. As the agency that hires, fires and controls expenditure, the image projected by RDI/Stockwatch when dealing with stakeholders is attributed to the project. Consequently, its influence in project management, especially the communication, organization and control aspects may have more significance in affecting relationships with key stakeholders than previously thought. Even as the project consciously moves to improve overall communications with its stakeholders, this role may need to be reviewed and/or realistically supervised by OAU/IBAR. Without this, the image is unlikely to improve sufficiently- and the other communication efforts made by the project will not sustain the necessary goodwill required for effective stakeholder cooperation.

### **5.2.3. Personnel Policies**

In the past, project staff have been “recruited” for jobs they were not qualified for. Similarly, they have been “dismissed” without warning. *The truth or*

*otherwise of these reports notwithstanding, the fact that staff believe them clearly demonstrates the need for some form of personnel guidelines.* It was obvious that staff did not know the procedures used in recruitment, selection, performance appraisal and dismissal.

Without clear personnel policies, staff did not know the procedures to follow when they had issues that needed resolution. Consequently they feared that they could be dismissed without warning. This was a significant contributor to low staff morale. In the absence of clear policies, staff were reluctant to take initiative and make decisions. Besides creating the impression that they had no initiative, this state of affairs unnecessarily overloaded senior project management with routine decision-making.

The nature of the contracts is another factor contributing to low staff morale. Since FITCA is not a legal entity, staff felt that it cannot enter into binding contracts. Without a legal status, contracts drawn under their name would be difficult to enforce. Moreover, some of the contracts for professional staff did not clearly describe the tasks to be done.

Compared to other projects supervised by the OAU/IBAR, salaries paid to FITCA staff were comparatively lower. One may wish to advance the argument that salaries were given within a “willing buyer, willing seller” context. That is correct. Nevertheless, the current situation in which the same “employer”, OAU/IBAR is perceived to “discriminate” against local staff by paying them less than half what staff on other projects earn can only have a negative impact on staff morale. Once staff members realize the differences in income for similar jobs, the immediate reaction is that their contribution is not valued as much as that of staff in the other projects. Changing this perception requires explanation from the employer. Staff concerned have not fully accepted the explanation given. This situation was further aggravated by the prevailing condition in which there was no logical link between tasks and responsibilities to be accomplished and the salaries paid to staff.

While the key is not in having a series of policy manuals, understanding the need for and creating a mechanism that enables staff to be fully aware of the boundaries within which they can legitimately operate is crucial for good personnel relations. Whether written as manuals or guidelines, they must be adequately communicated to all staff in order to limit staff excuses for making decisions outside their mandates. Their understanding by staff would clearly improve the internal working environment. By reducing fear and insecurity, staff morale would increase and they more than likely would take more initiative in project activities.

#### **5.2.4 Stakeholder Communications**

Communication mechanisms between the project staff, staff of the MOARD and other stakeholders needs to be developed and kept “open”. Some of the issues leading to low staff morale and dissatisfaction from staff of collaborating institutions may appear to some members of the PMU as “trivial” in nature.

Perhaps they are. Unfortunately, when they begin to impact negatively on project activities, they cease to be trivial. Until they have been amicably resolved with the staff and other stakeholders concerned, they remain important and legitimate issues of contention.

The attitude by project management to classify otherwise public information from consultancy reports as “confidential” can only increase the level of mistrust from stakeholders and fuel accusations of lack of transparency. A restrictive information dissemination policy creates an information gap. Information gaps lead to speculation and sometimes misinformation about the project. In such circumstances, likeminded stakeholders may be forgiven for applying the same rules to selectively pass on project information to the detriment of the project. It is policies like these which create a conducive environment for the recent situation in which project activities became the subject of an editorial piece in Kenya’s most widely circulated newspaper, the “Nation”.

### **5.3 Relationships With National Institutions**

If there is seriousness of purpose by all parties concerned, none of the problems being faced by the project are insurmountable. However, successful collaboration requires that all stakeholders re-focus their efforts on the project goal rather than becoming preoccupied with issues of control of financial resources/project ownership, which, while important for GoK reporting purposes, add no value to the plight of the communities. What is required is a desire and commitment by the main stakeholders, *namely* KETRI and the DVS, to consciously make a contribution to the rural development process of the communities in the project area.

The full co-operation of the DVS and KETRI is essential for project progress. In so far as tsetse control is the starting point from which livestock production and other activities proceed, then it means that for the project to succeed, all stakeholders must play their role. The non-cooperation of any key stakeholder will necessarily constrain implementation of project activities by those who are cooperating. In the absence of alternative arrangements, piecemeal involvement may delay implementation significantly—*and*, depending on the stakeholder concerned, perhaps by as many as two years. The project can only reduce this delay by identifying the tasks to be performed and recruiting a complete staff complement of all the personnel categories required to provide sufficient technical support in all the districts.

#### **5.3.1 Relationship With The DVS.**

Rightly or wrongly, the DVS is convinced that they should be the project implementers. It is true that the DVS has the technical capacity to implement certain aspects of the project. In fact between them, the DVS and KETRI have the technical capacity required to implement most components of the project. Unfortunately, stakeholders conceded that the DVS did not have a reputable track record in project implementation. The overriding interest in “project

ownership” by the DVS should perhaps be seen against that background – control of the financial resources and not necessarily more effective project implementation. There is a serious misconception – somewhat entrenched in the national psyche, that donor money is “freely available” for use as the implementers choose. This misconception, also held by some of the collaborating government departments and institutions needs to change if the project is to stop experiencing difficulties related to financial expenditure from them.

Similarly, these institutions need to be reminded that the project is not a substitute for regular GoK contributions towards tsetse control and cannot therefore be expected to take responsibility for financing routine reporting of DVS activities from the districts.

### **5.3.2 Relationship With KETRI**

The breakdown in communication between KETRI and the PMU does not augur well for implementation of project activities. Disagreements between project management and KETRI appeared to be based on both substantive and personal issues. The unresolved issue of field allowances to be paid to staff of KETRI on FITCA project activities has further reduced the scope for collaboration by alienating KETRI field staff; who otherwise have no substantive problems with the project. At the time of this assignment, it became apparent that there were irreconcilable differences of opinion on technical issues between staff of KETRI and the PMU. To some extent, this may explain why KETRI is still collaborating with the regional component of FITCA while being unable to sustain a working relationship with the local component.

KETRI’s capacity to implement all aspects of the project is a matter of opinion. Conflicting reports indicated that they were unable to successfully complete some aspects of an assignment previously given to them by FITCA (K) leading to incomplete payment for their services. The inability of KETRI and the project to amicably resolve this issue is a significant contributor to the sour relations between these institutions. This is bad publicity for the project and may be a more significant cause of the current breakdown in communication with KETRI and other collaborators than is currently acknowledged.

## **5.4 Field Relationships**

### **5.4.1. Activity Planning And Implementation**

Efforts made to involve stakeholders in participative planning are commendable. However, to a large extent, implementation schedules did not correspond with the plans agreed upon. While a number of reasons contributed to the delayed implementation, it is important that staff of the MOARD collaborating in such activities be advised well in advance about impending delays. Learning from other stakeholders that these activities will no longer be implemented with them (as has happened with some activities) or

that the activities are no longer being implemented as planned a few days to the implementation is demoralizing to staff. This has contributed to the dissatisfaction of some MOARD collaborators and reduced the goodwill they had towards the project. It appeared as if PMU did not provide sufficient guidelines to collaborators for preparing these budgets

The initiative to increase private sector participation in sustaining tsetse control activities is highly commendable. Unfortunately, some staff of the MOARD perceived it as attempt by FITCA to further exclude them from project activities. As a result, their support to private entrepreneurs participating in these efforts has – *at least in* Bungoma district rather lukewarm.

Misunderstandings such as these, if not amicably resolved with collaborators end up creating unnecessary delays to implementation of planned activities. This is serious because, at any rate, the current structure of the PMU lacks the human and professional capacity to effectively manage project activities in the 5 districts.

Since the arrival of the current TA, a number of interventions and activities have successfully been carried out by the project without involving government staff. While it is possible to “ignore” some government officers and still implement project activities, it is inadvisable to ignore the role of DC’s in the districts. Wherever feasible, it is important that their support to the project be encouraged. As overall Heads of Government in the districts, they have the authority to derail project implementation at the stroke of a pen.

Within the current policy and politico-institutional framework, the ruling party has to compete in an unpredictable election in the year 2002. Communities in the project area are major supporters of the ruling party. Normally, the GoK is suspicious of any community “*empowerment*” activities that do not originate from or actively involve them. To be accused of such “undesirable” *community empowerment* activities only requires that a “disgruntled” stakeholder peddle falsehoods about the project an important government functionary for the project to be suspended. The truth or otherwise of the accusations –and indeed the impact that suspension of project activities would have on the community would not feature in such accusations and or deliberations. It is therefore unwise to disregard the role of government officers in any activities dealing with communities. For similar reasons (especially at this point in time), staff of the MOARD may be reluctant to provide support to activities that appear to circumvent their involvement.

#### **5.4.2 Collaboration With Staff Of The MOARD At The District**

The lack of unequivocal support from the DVS on the one hand and disagreement with KETRI on the other has significantly contributed to the delay in implementation of some planned activities. This situation is further complicated by the fact that the number of FITCA technical staff on long-term contracts at this level is inadequate to supervise activity implementation in five districts (*see structure of PMU below*)

Personnel expressed willingness to cooperate in project implementation. What they required was a demonstration by their senior officers in Nairobi that the GoK was committed to cooperate with this project in assisting the communities in the project area. Only then would they be able to provide unqualified support to implementation of project activities. Field staff appeared to fully understand the long-term consequences of uncontrollable tsetse infestations—which probably explains their keen interest in supporting project interventions.

However, as long as DVO's had to respond to questions such as "...what is this FITCA thing you are telling me about..." from their senior officers, they were unable to give unqualified support to the project. In the case of KETRI staff, any support provided to the project would have to be in their private capacities. If found to have provided such support, they faced the risk of unspecified sanctions from their Management. That said, field allowances given to staff of KETRI by FITCA (K) were a key de-motivating factor and was inadequate to encourage them provide unqualified support to project activities.

In a number of cases, protocol was clearly not followed in dealing with important stakeholders, especially the GoK and EU. Similarly, feedback on project activities conducted with collaborators was not given on time. This had led to a feeling by some stakeholders of being "misused" by the project. Moreover, the perceived "mistrust" displayed by the PMU towards GoK officers had not improved collaboration. Although GOK staff may not have the necessary facilities to carry out some of their tasks, they nevertheless have access to valuable information about the communities in the district that the project can use to its advantage. The "non-recognition" of their potential in implementation of project activities has led them to reduce their support and commitment to project activities. Accorded due recognition, they have the capacity to advise the project on the appropriateness of many of the planned activities.

This constellation of issues has reduced the project's ability to adequately make use of existing networks and contributed to delayed implementation of some activities. The reluctance by the PMU to involve other projects/collaborators in the implementation of activities such as the purchasing of the livestock, improved cassava etc has led to unnecessary criticism by beneficiaries and stakeholders -to the detriment of the project's image.

## **5.5 Collaboration with Existing Projects**

A number of exciting initiatives to work with the private sector and other collaborative projects have been initiated. A significant number have resulted into successful collaborative efforts. However, a significant majority has become stillborn. A major reason for this appeared to be the absence of a formal mechanism to co-ordinate project activities both at the district and macro level. While networking is clearly the role of the chief executive, once initiatives have been made, follow-up should be delegated to other members

of the PMU. Delayed implementation of collaborative initiatives is frustrating to collaborators and leads to bad publicity.

## 5.6 Beneficiaries

Although politicians had psyched beneficiaries to expect “free” things from the project, they have gradually realized that those promises were made to gain political mileage. Beneficiaries were enthusiastic about project activities and were happy with the training that they had so far received. They were optimistic that project interventions would help them restock their herds and enhance farming and other activities. However, the slow speed of project implementation, provision of “low quality” animals and lack of timely delivery of other services has generated suspicion about the project in some quarters. Although this was not perceived as a significant source of misunderstanding, beneficiary support should not be taken for granted.

Most of the beneficiaries are not knowledgeable about development issues. A disgruntled person could easily misinform them and poison the existing good relationships currently existing with the project. In the longer term, unnecessary delays and suspicion can only reduce the current high levels of beneficiary interest in the project. This would be bad for project progress. Hence the need for speedy implementation of the remaining project interventions.

The responsibility of discussing/informing beneficiaries why one livestock breed is better than the other lies with project management. In the absence of such information, beneficiaries will tend to believe the views of other farmers /farmers participating in other projects /local livestock personnel regarding perceptions of quality animals. Project management’s understanding of appropriate /sustainable livestock breeds cannot be assumed to be common knowledge.

## 6.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

*These recommendations are made on the basis of the following value system.*

- *When working for public institutions, public interest should override personal interest.*
- *A master slave relationship should not be allowed in a collaborative effort.*
- *People should only expect rewards for work done and not their stations in life.*
- *Collaborators have an obligation to respect each other's inputs and cultural backgrounds.*
- *In the conduct of public affairs, the need for transparency in operations should be the overriding criterion in information dissemination.*

### 6.1 Relationships With Departments and Institutions In The MOARD

KETRI and the DVS are both departments in the MOARD. To improve working relationships between FITCA (K) and the MOARD, and in order to level stakeholder expectations, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the project and the Ministry should be drafted. The MOU should be clear on the expectations, roles and responsibilities of each of the stakeholders namely: Project Management, the DVS, KETRI, DLPO, DAO etc.

Although the financing agreement is the basis of the project implementation, it is recommended that more specific guidelines regarding the nature of support **expected** from the project and **by** the project be included in the MOU. To operationalize the MOU, it may be necessary to review the logframe with important stakeholders as a means to identify the key results and milestones expected during the remaining period of implementation. If it is decided that this is a matter to be addressed by the forthcoming MTR, then it is essential that the next WorkPlan be developed together with all key stakeholders.

### 6.2 Strategy For Drafting The MOU

Although a debriefing meeting for this assignment recommended another series of workshops with district based stakeholders, a realistic identification of stakeholder roles during the work planning meetings may be used as basis for drafting the MOU. The roles identified at this level would then be transmitted to head office/Ministry headquarters to check for compliance with government policy, endorsement and signature.

Notwithstanding the MOU, the Permanent Secretary, MOARD should provide clear unambiguous instructions to departments in the Ministry regarding co-operation in the implementation of project activities. This would go a long way towards addressing the current situation in which some departments of the Ministry are co-operating with the project while others are not. In the absence of such instructions, some departments/institutions may continue making unrealistic demands on the project management. If these demands are not

met, conflicts similar to the ones under review will emerge. Some personnel of the MOARD, especially those based in the districts – and who ought to be the major players driving collaboration with the GoK will be unable to provide unconditional support to project activities. In the process, the project will be unable to achieve the objectives for which it was designed.

KETRI has the human capacity required to competently implement some of the project activities. It should be encouraged to continue working with FITCA(K) on those aspects of the project for which it has the necessary expertise. In this connection, project management has a duty to review the demands made by KETRI and realistically respond to them. Personality clashes, which apparently are also part of this misunderstanding, should not be allowed to interfere with project implementation (*this aspect is further elaborated under communications*). However, allocating research money to KETRI merely because they are mandated to carry out tsetse fly research in Kenya is not an appropriate strategy for capacity building for two reasons: - (i) Non tsetse research issues are envisaged in the project design (ii) KETRI can competently seek donor funding for basic research (iii) As an institution, KETRI should derive more satisfaction from making successful bids (alone or in collaboration with others) and (iv). Even with the best of intentions, a public servant has limited authority in ensuring that funds in their bank account are used for the objective for which they were designed. KETRI is no exception.

As per current policy, the role of the DVS has increasingly shifted from provision to facilitation of veterinary services. Government policy is quite clear on that. It is therefore somewhat misleading for the directorate to claim that it has the capacity to implement this project. For several years now, the department has not recruited new technical staff in all categories. It is therefore thinly represented on the ground. Nevertheless, it is adequately represented at the district level – which, for the purposes of this project, is adequate representation. The project should therefore continue working closely with the department. In this respect, project management should endeavour to strengthen formal and informal working relationships with the DVOs.

It is anticipated that the National Project Coordinator recently nominated from the department will assist in strengthening these relationships by improving communication between the PMU, the DVS and other departments of the MOARD. In the event that the Coordinator is unable to “smoothen” these relationships, the strategic implications of having the department of livestock production as the project entry point should be explored. It is on record that the DLP has given unqualified support to this project and other livestock projects in the project area such as the Kenya –Finland Livestock Development Project.

### 6.3 District Collaborators

The DVS should clarify the role of the DVO with regard to FITCA activities in the district to enable them provide adequate support to the project. This would also enable them marshal support from the other departments of the MOARD for the realization of project objectives. In this capacity, the DVO should also be empowered to co-ordinate district project activities. In order to effectively do this, FITCA (K) should consider providing **appropriate** logistical support to the DVOs (where necessary) to enable them effectively play this role. This logistical appropriateness should be discussed between the project and the DVOs. It may for instance, include the rehabilitation of existing equipment for use in project related activities.

To further enhance cooperation with the DVOs, the following actions are recommended.

- (i) The Project should consider motivating collaborating staff of the MOARD by raising the daily allowances paid to them. At the very least, this increment should raise the allowances paid to the level that KETRI pays its staff and should be increased for all stakeholders. The PMU should not lose sight of the fact it is the project that needs the support of the collaborating staff and that only to a limited extent is the reverse true. To that extent, the overriding consideration in computing the allowances should be the **importance** of the activity to be undertaken and the **availability** of funds. In that respect, allowances paid to collaborators on project activities **need not be uniform**. Even as the project addresses logistical and other forms of support, staff of the MOARD should also be able to view cooperation with the project as a learning experience, which is of benefit to them
- (ii) The PMU should provide feedback to the DVO and other collaborators on all collaborative activities carried out in the district. In addition, PMU needs to desist from the current practice of treating ordinary information as “confidential”. The lack of feedback to the collaborators on planned project activities ordinarily breeds mistrust between them and project management. This reduces the quality and level of co-operation.
- (iii) The PMU must identify or develop a mechanism for co-coordinating district activities and facilitate the proceedings of this coordination. Currently, DLCCs are used to coordinate livestock related activities in the project area. Unless incorporating FITCA(K) activities contravenes EU policies and procedures, it would be more appropriate to make use of them rather than creating new structures. However, if the mandate of the DLCCs is considered inconsistent with that of the project, the practical implications of empowering the DVOs to coordinate these activities should be considered.

- (iv). On its part, the project management unit must change its attitude towards staff of the MOARD. It is a contradiction in terms to be seen to “mistrust” their integrity and technical capacity and at the same time seek their assistance in the implementation of certain project activities. Whereas some may not have the level of technical expertise desired by the project, they certainly are not responsible for some of these shortcomings. This inadequacy should not therefore be used against them. Similarly, they are certainly not employees of FITCA(K) and the PMU should not be seen to make such assumptions when dealing with them.

The project is already behind schedule in a number of key result areas. The PMU must therefore show more commitment to achieving project objectives by strengthening in-house human resource capacity or finding creative ways to work with them.

## **6.4 Organization for Project Management**

A project of this magnitude requires flexibility in order to respond effectively to changing situations. Nevertheless, a project management structure is necessary for effective coordination and implementation of project activities. In order to develop an organization for a project management unit, the following suggestions are made:

### **6.4.1. Organization of the PMU.**

The current PMU should review the project document in order to identify **key result areas** required in order to achieve the project purpose and identify key activities necessary for the achievement of the results. These should then be grouped together according to similarity of tasks. PMU should then assign responsibility and the necessary authority to each group of activities. Each of these groups would constitute a job category that is important for the effective implementation of project objectives.

Information systems to coordinate job categories and functions should be developed. The ensuing structure would help clarify who needs to do what and also allocate responsibility for achievement of key results. It would also improve overall performance by removing confusion and uncertainty in assignments, improve decision-making and promote the design of communication mechanisms that are consistent with the achievement of project objectives. Managers of each key result area should be given appropriate responsibility and delegated authority.

If necessary, a Human Resources Development consultant may assist with the job analysis and evaluation. Once the job categories have been identified, a commitment to fill them with appropriately qualified personnel should be made. In the event that project is unable to attract suitable employees due to salary constraints, then PMU should liaise with the MOARD to second appropriately qualified experts.

The role of RDI/Stockwatch is reportedly to provide local personnel, identify the TA and approve expenditure, their influence apparently extended into many more aspects of the project.

The PM should be empowered to have greater say in making decisions that affect implementation of the project. Unfortunately, the role of RDI/Stockwatch in approving expenditure of necessity **limits the ability** of the PM in taking key decisions. This is a design issue and is best handled during the MTR. Nevertheless, it may call for a review of the contract between RDI/Stockwatch and the EU. Unless such a review is made, key project management decisions will of necessity continue to be referred to/ made by RDI/Stockwatch.

Ideally, the PMU should recruit an Administrative Manager to take charge of daily operations. This officer should work directly under the PM. Ideally, the person recruited for the job should have the competence to advise the project manager on personnel issues such as contracts for long term and short-term assignments. In the absence of a communications manager, this person should also be empowered to play a greater role in managing communications with the various stakeholders, especially in the field. In this capacity, the officer should understand local value systems and GoK procedures and consult closely with the liaison officer. It may be useful in the first instance to assess whether persons with such skills currently exist in the PMU.

#### **6.4.2 Recruitment and selection**

Subject to financial availability, personnel recruited for the professional positions should be given long-term (i.e. one to two (1-2) year) contracts. In addition- and depending on the importance of the job category with respect to the attainment of project objectives, persons so recruited should have the capacity to provide professional leadership to personnel of the MOARD. Appropriately qualified staff may be recruited through recruitment firms or through headhunting firms.

Although, it is not necessary to have written policies and guidelines for recruitment and selection, it is important that criteria for this be developed and disseminated to all personnel. Similarly, and in order to avoid unnecessary conflicts, criteria for performance appraisal should be developed and communicated to all personnel. In its own way, this would also contribute to staff motivation. Most consulting firms have personnel selection and recruitment departments; however, headhunting firms are few.

#### **6.4.3 Stakeholder Communications**

In order to improve overall communications, PMU should develop a mechanism to facilitate vertical and horizontal information flows and collaborative relations. As a first step in this process, the information needs of the different stakeholders (*including project management itself*) should be analyzed and categorized. The information produced by project activities

should also be analyzed into different categories: **confidential, public** and **important** and so on to weed out unnecessary information. Information on regulations, policies and procedures; information emanating from meetings, workshops etc; information about personnel needs, achievements and rewards; information about project achievements and so on needs to be disseminated to one or a number of stakeholders.

PMU must make a decision about the channels to use in communicating with its stakeholders, including members of staff, and make an appropriate balance about the same. They must decide *when written information is necessary, when a workshop or a meeting is appropriate, when a staff memo or telephone call is best , or even when a face-to-face meeting is the most appropriate means of communication*. Efforts should also be made to improve the overall environment for project management by providing some form of motivation to staff. Such motivations may include the following:

- Increasing teamwork in decision making
- Designing definitive reporting lines
- Refining personal communication skills to include empathy while communicating with staff and other stakeholders.

In order to comply with the requirements of protocol, all official communication to the MOARD should be made by the project implementers, OAU/IBAR. Guidelines for communicating with stakeholders need to be developed by (or in collaboration with) the project implementer and disseminated to project staff. In the absence of a communications expert, OAU/IBAR should take charge of communications with the key stakeholders-with the liaison officer providing consultative support.

In practice, the project manager should only disseminate information on behalf of OAU/IBAR. To reduce accusations by some stakeholders of lacking transparency, project management should make a commitment to implement project activities agreed upon during the planning workshops. Any changes to these plans should be communicated immediately to those concerned.

#### **6.4.4 Personnel Policies**

In order to enhance staff morale, and engender commitment to the achievement of project objectives, the following suggestions are made:

- Policies and procedures for staff recruitment and selection, performance appraisal, reporting, promotions and rewards, discipline and dismissal be drafted and discussed with staff.
- Staff salaries should be rationalized and adjusted to reflect importance and complexity of tasks being carried out. Funds allowing, they should be made comparable to those paid to nationals in similar projects implemented by the OAU.

- A single employer – either OAU/IBAR or RDI/Stockwatch, should draw up all contracts. As the project implementer, OAU/IBAR should draw up all the contracts. Notwithstanding the logic behind the three-month renewable short-term contracts, at the current rates of remuneration, they are bad for staff morale. Creating the impression that these are consultancy assignments, as the project consultant would have us believe only goes to show the need for written guidelines. If they are “temporary” employees or whatever name they are given, they must all have a common understanding of their status in the project. A consultancy assignment paid for at the daily rate of U.S.\$ 2 would be an interesting topic of discussion in meetings of the Association of Professional Societies in East Africa. This would not be good publicity.

If the job analysis or other objective criteria recommends that the services of staff on these contracts are still required, then their contracts should be extended to longer-term ones. If they are not, then their contracts should be replaced with realistic consultancy terms and rates.

- Project management should identify a system, financial or otherwise, which they can use to reward and motivate staff towards better performance in achieving project objectives. The recent proposal to support staff simultaneously pursue graduate studies as they work on the project is an innovative step in the right direction.

#### **6.4.5 Project Leadership**

The management style adopted by PM is excellent for efficient implementation of project activities within a performance-oriented culture. However, while technical competence in one core area of the project's key result areas is critical in a project of this size, project management necessarily involves balancing human, technical, conceptual and decision-making skills. Indeed, conceptual and decision-making skills may be more critical to the PM's role than technical skills. For the purpose of managing a project that needs to collaborate with bureaucratic institutions, there appeared to be a dearth of some of these skills in both the PMU and RDI/Stockwatch, the technical assistance provider. Senior staff of the PMU need to commit themselves to making more use of human relations skills in dealing with staff and other stakeholders, especially staff of the MOARD. In addition, there may be a case for some members of the PMU to be more sensitive to local cultural norms and value systems and adapt management style accordingly.

If this is not possible due to the exigencies of the project, the PM and RDI/Stockwatch should reduce their contact hours with important stakeholders by delegating external stakeholder communications either to:-

- (i) The Liaison officer in collaboration with OAU/IBAR
- (ii) An administrative officer or
- (iii) A communications expert.

At the same time, rather than adopt a “lone ranger” attitude in project implementation activities, the PMU should endeavour to use the expertise of existing networks (*local and international research institutes, similar tsetse programmes in region and other rural development/ livestock projects in the region*). Identifying what they can offer and then discussing modalities for cooperation can do this. In the short to medium term, this may appear to be unnecessary work; in the longer term however, this networking would contribute to savings on operational costs. In addition, the OAU/IBAR should play a greater supervisory role by providing more leadership and management advice to the project. It is possible that RDI/Stockwatch is merely filling a void created by the “hands off” approach adopted by the implementing agency.

## **6.5 Management Controls**

Although probably not perceived as important at this stage of implementation, it is important to remember that human resource management problems are a normal feature of any organization. In order to have an objective basis for assessing performance, it is important that standards of performance be established, mechanisms to measure this performance be put in place and procedures for taking corrective action be established. This would avoid future potential accusations of partiality in cases of staff dismissals and promotions.

## **6.6 Staff Training in Management**

In order to improve the overall environment for project management, and especially the communications element, staff of the PMU and important stakeholders should attend some training in basic project management. Many local and international firms in Nairobi have the capacity to effectively provide this kind of training at competitive rates.

# **ANNEX 1:**

## **TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THIS ASSIGNMENT**

# **Farming in tsetse control areas project Kenya Component (7 ACP KE 087)**

## **Terms of Reference Management Expert.**

### **1. Introduction**

The Kenya component of the Farming in Tsetse Control Areas (FITCA) is part of a regional program for 6 East African countries. The overall objective of the Kenya component is to improve the welfare of the people in the region through sustainable rural development and the project purpose is to increase livestock productivity. Improved animal health, management and nutrition, and the gradual upgrading of the indigenous stock will result in an increase in livestock products.

The program is not a classical tsetse and trypanosomosis control project but a rural development program with emphasis on livestock improvement. The areas of implementation are five Districts in Western Kenya bordering Uganda. The area is densely populated so that no new land can be opened up but the productivity of the existing systems will be improved.

An important feature of the program is the involvement of the communities, which will, by increased income from livestock and cash crops, be enabled to continue tsetse and trypanosomosis control after the end of the project.

### **2. Background of the programme**

The European Union funds the FITCA program. The Director of OAU/IBAR is the Regional Authorising (RAO) Officer for the Regional Component of FITCA and he acts also as National Authorizing Officer (NAO) for FITCA Kenya. This component is the only FITCA country project that is directly under the responsibility of the RAO, which means that the project is implemented through the OAU/IBAR office in Nairobi (see Financing Agreement). The activities of the project are managed by a Project Management Unit based in Busia. This constellation results in difficulties of identification of the national authorities to associate themselves with the project (misunderstanding of ownership).

The project had a slow start with replacement partly because the project is still suffering from problems experienced before the replacement of the first TA but another reason identified seems to be a disturbed relation between FITCA (K) and the GoK institutions, or at least with some departments of MOARD.

Over the last 5-10 years the Kenya government has suffered serious financial constraints, which have led to drastic reductions in disbursement of funds to MOARD. As a consequence, the activities of the public agricultural sector in Western Kenya have virtually stopped. The assumption in the Financing agreement for the FITCA Kenya project that the veterinary department would sustain tsetse control activities. However when the project commenced the expectation of both politicians and technical staff from MOARD seemed to be that the project would assume the role of GOK and Maintain and finance tsetse control activities.. The resulting

misunderstanding led to disillusionment of various partners and raise questions about resources project ownership and what FITCA Kenya should or could do. It had been hoped that GoK would increase funds to enable veterinary staff to work with the project.

FITCA Kenya does not have enough staff the design of the project was such that FITCA would work closely with Government staff at the district level to implement the project activities. The project therefore works with different government departments in the MOARD. At District level the project has professional relations for its different activities with the:

- District Veterinary Officer + 2 Deputies, District Zoologist, District Livestock Production Officer, District Agricultural Officer, District Agriculture and Livestock Extension Officer

In the past the project has worked well with other departments except the veterinary department which feels excluded from decisions in spite of its important role in the Steering Committee and has since long time resented that no national co-ordinator had been nominated for FITCA Kenya (which is the case in all other country projects). The proposal to nominate the Chief Zoologist as National co-ordinator is very recent.

FITCA depends also on close collaboration with the national institution dealing with tsetse and trypanosomosis (KETRI). It has a field station within the project area and has well trained staff that can do work for FITCA on contract basis. However, KETRI is also always suffering from decreased funding.

The project has also experienced problems in flow of information with both parties claiming not to be able to access relevant information or not being adequately briefed on issue relevant to the project and also the government department people and not knowing whom to take orders from.

For several years cattle had been dying in the area to an extent that many farmers had lost nearly all their animals. The loss of the draught animals had deprived the farmers of ploughing by animal traction, what has resulted in less cultivated surfaces and bush re-growth. A survey carried out for FITCA revealed that the cause of the mortality was trypanosomosis.

Farmers expected a quick assistance by FITCA but FITCA did not intervene in the field and therefore the relations with opinion leaders turned sour. FITCA had to cope with a negative image from that time on

In several meetings, e.g. Steering Committee Meetings, it became clear that there are different views on certain aspects of the project. FITCA (K) has prepared a draft memorandum of understanding to define a *modus operadi*. The steering committee has endorsed the idea of having a memorandum of understanding between the OAU/IBAR and then to clearly define the *modus operadi*

The locally employed staff on the project have Complained about their contractual situation with the project because of its legal situation as a Kenyan national project,

not being registered with the registrar for societies (all other OAU/IBAR implemented projects are regional or continental).

An evaluation mission from EU that had visited the project became aware of these tensions and in order to avoid a negative impact on project progress recommended this short-term mission to assess eventual management problems and propose solutions.

### **The objective of the Consultancy**

The main recommendations on modalities for project implementation, in keeping with EU procedures to reach active collaboration between the institutions concerned in order to benefit the population.

### **To achieve the above objective the consultant will**

Clearly identify and review areas of tension that possibly prevent a harmonious co-operation of the institutions concerned, evaluate the eventual impact of the animosities on project progress.

Some areas of tension have already been identified and consequently the following areas and issues shall be assessed and reviewed:

- Working relationship of both national authorities and Government staff at district level and FITCA (K) shall be studied and the FITCA project.
- Relations between the National Institution for Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Research (KETRI) and FITCA (K) shall be examined
- Communication /flow of information between the project and all stake holders and make suggestions on how to improve.
- Situation between locally employed staff and the management of FITCA (K). Contractual situation shall be assessed and the atmosphere in the project in general. Eventual grievances of staff shall be followed up.
- The consultant will review the draft memorandum of understanding prepared by OAU/IBAR and solicit Contributions from all the other stakeholders.
- The consultant will then convene a meeting to discuss the draft MOU and present his findings and recommendations.

### **Expected results**

1.A report containing findings and recommendations on how to improve the working relationships in view of collaboration to achieve project goals.

2.A draft memorandum of understanding

### **4.Plan of work**

The consultant will review the National component of the FITCA program for Kenya in Nairobi as well as in Western Kenya where the project area is. Field visits shall be carried out.

In Nairobi, the consultant will have access to all the relevant documentation. He/she will visit the EC delegation, The RAO -OAU/IBAR, MOARD, Department of Veterinary medicine, KETRI and other relevant institutions.

The consultant will liaise with the representative of the consultancy firm providing technical assistance to the project (Stockwatch LTD), interview the Technical Assistant and the liaison officer as well as the other locally employed senior project staff.

The consultant will hold a one-day workshop to discuss the draft memorandum of understanding.

As the consultancy includes a field visit to western Kenya (Busia and some districts) duration of 15 days shall be envisaged.

### **5. Profile of the expert required**

Preferably a management consultant with expertise Human resource aspects of project management and good experience of Kenyan administration.

### **6. Reporting**

A draft report and Memorandum of understanding shall be submitted to OAU/IBAR two weeks after finishing the consultancy for comments.

If after two weeks after submission no written comments are made by OAU/IBAR, the report is considered as adopted.

### **7. Time schedule**

The exercise will commence on the 15<sup>th</sup> October 2001.

# **ANNEX 2:**

## **TERMS OF REFERENCE PREPARED BY MANAGEMENT**

# **ANNEX 3:**

# **PERSONS CONTACTED**

## **ANNEX 3: PERSONS CONTACTED**

### **NATIONAL COLLABORATING INSTITUTIONS**

1. Dr. Rajinder Kumar Saini, Principal Scientist, Tsetse Programme Leader and Head, Animal Health Division, ICIPE, Box 30772 Nairobi.
2. Dr. J.W.Ssenyonga, Social Science Research Unit, I.C.I.P.E Box 30772, Nairobi.
3. Dr. Catherine MASITSA, National Project Officer, Rural Development, European Union, Box 45119, Nairobi
4. Dr. Bernard Rey, Rural Development Adviser European Union, Box 45119, Nairobi
5. Dr. Jonathan Orengo, Senior Sales Representative (Veterinary), HighChem Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Box 30467, Nairobi
6. Dr. Ngugi Chege, Product Development, High Chem Pharmaceuticals, Ltd.Box 30467, Nairobi
7. Dr. J.F.A Moses Onim, Managing Director, Lagrotech Seed Company, P.O Box 1244, Kisumu
8. John J. Othina, Accountant, Agribusiness Development Support Project, Lagrotech Consultants, Box 1244, Kisumu
9. John Otieno Nyakora, District Field Extensionist (Siaya/Bondo), Lagrotech Consultants, Box 1019' Siaya
10. Dr. Daniel Bourzat, Scientific Advisor for Environment OAU/UBAR, Box 30786, Nairobi
11. Tim Robinson, ILRI, P.O.Box Nairobi.
12. Dr. Mathu Ndungu, Director, KETRI, P.O.Box 362, Kikuyu
13. Dr. Grace Murila, Deputy Director (Research) KETRI, P.O Box 362, Kikuyu
14. Dr. G.N. Mwangela, Deputy Director (Veterinary Services) MOARD, Box Nairobi
15. P.Chege Ruhui, Chief Zoologist MOARD, Box Nairobi
16. Dr. KarlHeinz Politzar, Technical Advisor, FITCA Regional
17. Dr. Solomon H. Mariam, Chief Livestock Projects Officer, OAU/IBAR, Box 30786, Nairobi
18. Dr. J.T. Musiime, Chief Livestock Production Officer, and Acting Director, OAU/IBAR, P.O. Box 30786, Nairobi.
19. Dr. Rosemary Dolan, Director, Stockwatch Ltd

### **FITCA (K) BUSIA AND NAIROBI OFFICES**

20. Dr. Burkhard Bauer, Project Manager
21. Francis Oloo, Liason Officer
22. Ms. Maida Awori, GIS Data Manager
23. Ms. Lucy Njeri, Assistant Sociologist
24. Ms. Caroline Sikuku, Animal Husbandry
25. Daniel Muchiri Wachira, Accountant/ Administrator

26. Ms Winnie Olubai, Project Sociologist
27. Ms. Grace Maloba, Secretary – PMU
28. Mwangi Mburu, Financial Controller
28. Mrs Jane W. Karanja, Secretary, NLO

### **KENYA-FINLAND LDP**

29. Mr.Harri Porvali, Programme Co-ordinator, Kenya- Finland Livestock Development, Programme, Programme Co-ordination Unit, P.O Box 7131, Kisumu
30. Henry K. Ngeno, National Co-ordinator, Kenya – Finland Livestock Development Programme, Programme Coordination Unit, P.O Box 731, Kisumu
31. OP.K. Otieno, Coordinator (Livestock), LDP, Busia
32. Carolus O. Ayugi, Coordinator (Cooperatives), LDP, Busia

### **TESO DISTRICT TEAM**

33. Abdul Mwaserah, District Commissioner, Teso District
34. R.M. Kitonga, District Livestock Development Officer, Teso
35. Francis Ateka Ony'ayo, Livestock Officer
36. Dr. James M. Merisya, District Livestock Officer
37. G.G. Kamure, Zoologist.

### **KETRI, ALUPE STATION**

38. Tom Okedi, Laboratory Technologist
39. John Njenga , Senior Laboratory Technologist
40. Dr. Joseph Sulo, Medical Doctor
41. Julia Karuga, Sociologist

### **BUSIA DISTRICT TEAM**

42. Dr. R.W. Kiboi, District Dairy Officer
43. R.J.A Ohore, Dairy Officer
44. Rose Kahai, District Poultry Officer
45. Jared Isaboke Mose, District Crops Officer
46. Dr. K. Murekefu, District Veterinary Officer
47. A.S. Kaptalai, District Agriculture and Livestock Extension Officer

## **BONDO DISTRICT TEAM**


48. J.O Oloo, District Animal Production Officer, Box 113, Bondo
49. R. Ochwada, DIE, Box 113, Bondo
50. A.P. Odhingo, DHERYO, Box 113, Bondo
51. P.Oluoch MBAI, District Crops Officer, Box113, Bondo
52. Maurice O. Wambiya, District Dairy Officer, Box 113, Bondo
53. Achoka Bonaventure, District Farm Management officer Box 113, Bondo
54. R. O Ongon'g, D.H.S.O, Box 430, Bondo
55. H.B. Arita, D.S.C.O, Box 113, Bondo
56. Tom Ogutu Madiany, D.A. O Box 113, Bondo
57. Dr. S.O Orot, D.V.O, Box 430, Bondo
58. Mugeni, DLPO, Box 113, Bondo
59. Andika Semo, DFO, Box 328, Bondo
60. Daniel Nyatuoro, District Forester, Box 113, Bondo
61. John Otiu Wajango, L.H.A., Box 430, Bondo
62. N.O.Hiribae, Commisioner, Busia District

## **PROVINCIAL TEAM, KISUMU**

63. Dr. J.M Ogada – Amumu, Provincial Director of Veterinary Services, P.O Box 974, Kisumu
64. Dr. R.D.H Adoyo, Deputy PDVS, Box 974, Kisumu
65. John W. Taiti, Provincial Zoologist, Box 66, Kisumu
66. Dr. P.K. Kalerwa , Deputy Provincial Veterinary Officer (Hygiene), Box 974, Kisumu.
67. B.O Adul, Livestock Officer, Box 974, Kisumu

## **PRIVATE VETERINARIANS/AGROVETS**

68. Dr. Ephantus Kariuki, Private Veterinarian, Box 793, Busia
69. Antony Wahome, Busia Agrovet, Busia
70. Joseph Karanja – Busia
71. Simon Karanja – Research Scientist
72. Bernard Oloo – Siaya



# **ANNEX 4:**

## **COMMENTS MADE BY PROJECT MANAGEMENT**

## **Re: Comments On The Latest Draft Of The “Management Review of FITCA-Kenya”**

1. Generally, the present draft is not an important improvement, taking into consideration the numerous comments from the project management and StockWatch Ltd. (for the sake of completeness it is deemed necessary to include these comments they are lacking in the present version).
2. It has been suggested to the consultant to concentrate on matters pertaining to management and leave out all technical matters (where he lacks expertise), in order to present a more concise report.
3. Factual and unverified statements should have been avoided. Yet they still constitute an important part of the report. It would have been better to remain with assertions where “reportedly” would have indicated the factual nature of most of his statements. Under conclusions (C8, C10) the consultant gives examples for what – according to him – are reasons for the lack of willingness and the level of mistrust of district staff to collaborate with the project. This has never been verified with the project management.
4. Under C 10 he also concludes that an article in “The Nation” newspaper “in which project activities recently became the subject of an editorial” was based on “misinformation about the project”. Had he wanted to help the project in overcoming problems in the relationship between the management and Gok staff he should have tried to verify the source of information and the reasons leading to this editorial.
5. The role of RDI/StockWatch has been transformed from “negative pervasive influence” into “their pervasive influence” (F. 10 – Executive Summary) or under conclusions (C7) a “... more negative impact in project relationships with key stakeholders ...” The consultant has been asked but fails to qualify the source of this assertion. Under “Recommendations” (R 3) he again refers to “RDI/Stock Watch’s pervasive influence in project decisions” ending with “the OAU/IBAR should play a greater role in the management of the project. This may call for a review of certain aspects of the contract between RDI/StockWatch and the EU”. Taking into account recent strenuous efforts and public statements by the assistant of the rural development advisor at the Delegation to “throw Dr. R. Dolan out of the project” the reasons for the consultant’s insistence on this part may be seen in a different light.
6. “Limitations of the assignment” (P2) are explained in three paragraphs, among others that the “Project Manager was unavailable for most of the period...” Reasons for this absence and an explanation for the lack of proper time planning for the consultancy are not given. In all fairness, the verification/confirmation by the project management of all factual statements should have been given at least the same space as was given to KETRI, the DVS and other GoK staff to complain about improper treatment by the project management of their staff!

7. Mention has already been made to suggest that the consultant avoid any elaboration of technical matters. On page 11 (Livestock Development Programme) he mentions (that) “although LDP had several years' of experience in the procurement of bulls and other animals, the PMU made no effort to seek their assistance when procuring animals for the farmers. Consequently, the animals they purchased were perceived as of “inferior” quality by the farmers”. Under “Annex 3: Persons contacted” the “farmers” transform into no. 73 one (1) farmer: Martin Etyang Wambale – Busia: does this fall under a case of pluralis majestatis? Under “relationship with beneficiaries” we also read (that) “the few farmers interviewed (had) expressed...” For the sake of completeness it would be better to give a full list of farmers being interviewed. The consultant should also avoid covering different project periods, as given in the same paragraph. “For instance, although farmer(s) had been promised Friesian/Aryshire breed of cows, instead they were given the Aryshire/Orma breed. They were however unhappy with them”. This part of the report once more exemplifies the need for the consultant to focus on matters where he has sufficient professional skills. Twelve high quality crossbred animals were bought before the arrival of the present project manager. The reasons for buying this particular cross do not need to be justified here.
8. There is a profound misconception of the consultant on matters pertaining to FITCA’s dealing with the primary beneficiaries which is exemplified in the same paragraph as above: “At the same time, unlike in NALEP/SIDA project activities, participants in FITCA (K) training programs did not receive any refreshments or financial incentives of any type. This had led to some suspicion about the project from the beneficiaries”. The project tries (and always has to try!) to avoid creating an attitude of dependency on the farmer’s side with regard to all implemented activities. This is increasingly understood by all stakeholders, not least our primary beneficiaries!
9. For the sake of being brief further examples for wrong assertions are avoided. We would all be better served by a report, which is focusing on the important matters rather than spreading trifles over a vast part of this report. The first paragraph on page 29 (Personnel policies) is however wide off the mark and should therefore be erased. If we then could have a report without numerous repetitions it would definitely be a better read!
10. The consultant must explain why – contrary to his TORs – he has not delivered a draft memorandum of understanding (Expected results, no. 2).
11. In conclusion: the report in its present form should not be accepted unless there is a considerable improvement in the whole text and a clear focus on matters where the consultant possesses professional expertise.

**Dr. Burkhard Bauer**

**Project Manager, FITCA - Kenya**

**Management review of FIIICA-Kenya**  
**“Final draft”, December 2001**

1. The draft document still lacks a clear and logical structure, it could be improved if repetitions were avoided. Yet in “objectives, findings, conclusions and recommendations” a considerable amount of clarity is lost due to overlapping and repetitive statements.
2. What was the “objective” of this review? The reader is confronted with three different versions. For the sake of clarity it is preferable to present the objective once – as given in the TORs, even if the grammar of the particular text contains mistakes and poor English (Annex 1, page 10 of 11). In the previous comments it was mentioned that during his short and obviously non-committal discussion with the project manager the consultant himself admitted of having problems in understanding the exact meaning of the TORs. However, suppressing his own doubts the consultant plows ahead, reaching the same conclusions/recommendations as in the first draft. At least we read however that the consultant admits that he did not have adequate time to clarify some of the issues with the project manager (p 2). Yet at the end of this paragraph we read with relief (that) “it is the consultant’s considered opinion that the findings/results would not have been substantially different from the current ones”. In other words, critical remarks are admissible but will not be considered.
3. It has been recommended – and I still think the document could be improved if these recommendations were taken into account – to eliminate as much as possible assertions given by individuals. The term “reportedly” appears 18 times on 11 pages! (why not use instead the term unconfirmed information by the way?) To give but one example about the correctness of one of these statements: on page 7 we read about a visit of a German filming crew “without the prior knowledge of the DVO or the DC”, and “though this crew promised to send back slides of their work in the district, so far nothing has been heard of them”. It is unfortunate that the impression of a sub-standard and possibly biased consultancy is further exacerbated when sifting through the numerous assertions. Had the consultant taken the diligence to confirm this assertion by asking the project manager, he would have been informed about an official information of the district staff, including the DC, of the impending visit of the German team. He could have even verified their visits in the visitors’ books of both the DC in Busia and in Teso! By the way, a presentation of the crew’s report on the German channel of ARD had been planned and was even announced for the second half of September. It is self-explanatory that the report could not be presented in the course of the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>. In conclusion: the consultancy report could be substantially shortened and improved (at least to some extent) if all assertions based on “reportedly” were eliminated.
4. We are repeatedly (at least 6 times) confronted with the “negative” and/or “pervasive influence/impact of RDI/StockWatch” on the project. The source of this statement is not uncovered. It is my opinion that such a grave statement be discussed openly and as quickly as possible within the inner core of stakeholders, ie OAU/IBAR, EU, StockWatch and the project management. For the record – there is really no need to elaborate on the absurdity of the

assertion with regard to StockWatch's "pervasive role" on the day-to-day work of the project – I can only appreciate the supportive and clearly positive role, particularly of StockWatch, in matters pertaining not only to project administration but also with regard to a number of technical aspects.

- 5. We also read repeatedly about the habit of PMU to "classify otherwise public information as confidential" = Conclusion No. 10. It remains the consultant's secret how this observation can be considered as a "conclusion", once more underlining the need – as earlier mentioned – for a clearer structure of the report( cf 1<sup>st</sup> paragraph of my comments). Yet we would still be grateful to know how this assertion was derived.
6. High turn-over of staff: we read with serious concern on page 5 that the previous TA, the Livestock Production Specialist and the Training Officer had "left" the project after 5 – 11 months. On a somewhat contradictory note we then read on page 6 that all of them were "dismissed" (with) "no opportunity to defend themselves". This is not correct. Dismissed staff knew full well their rights and were explained the reasons for the termination of their contracts. They were also encouraged to seek legal advice in case they wanted to contest the termination of their contracts.
7. Management problems at the level of the PMU are frequently mentioned. It is sad to conclude that the consultant failed to come to grips with a dilemma at the PMU: for various reasons, which are not the responsibility of the present project management, the impact of FITCA-K at farmers' level was perceived as small at best. Prioritization of project activities was therefore urgently required with obvious consequences. Whatever the project management had to implement would have had negative consequences for the tackling of other problems. Creativity and innovation in the first phase were more important than the establishment of an optimal PMU organization structure. How many firms go presently bust despite their managerial skills? If there is no identification of the main constraints combined with creative thinking of how to resolve these constraints, the project would have gone nowhere despite its managerial competence! The history of tsetse control projects in sub-Saharan Africa is strewn with failures. The mention of tsetse control project raises even hackles at the level of the donor community. The present phase requires therefore new, or even revolutionary approaches, old, down-trodden paths have to be avoided. This implied that final decisions, for instance on matters pertaining to disease management practices at farm level had to be made by the project manager – after as much as possible extensive discussions with project staff at the PMU. This was the only viable solution, given the professional background of the project staff.
8. The consultant was informed by the project manager about the need of a discussion of the inner core of stakeholders: OAU/IBAR, EU, StockWatch and the project management (the reported pervasive and negative influence of StockWatch was not discussed – at least in the presence of the project management – one more reason to discuss quickly and extensively). He would have found this recommendation in the annual reports had he read all project documents. Until now the roles of these partners are not clearly defined. This has led to continuous interference at the PMU level. This is a serious managerial problem. Unless the roles and tasks of the above-mentioned stakeholders are clearly defined there is a considerable likelihood of new "management problems". Micro-management of the project by EU or

OAU/IBAR must be avoided under all circumstances. What is required at the level of these two organizations is facilitation and support of the project in a complicated political environment.

9. The consultant was also informed that project staff had been encouraged to short-cut circuits instead of following hierarchical lines. In other words, anybody of the staff, who would have been dissatisfied with her/his position had been encouraged to complain about the project management at the “higher level” (OAU/IBAR, EU)! It is astonishing to note that the consultant failed to comment on this problem. One prime managerial task is to select qualified staff. It is also obvious that professional competence is a key element for staff selection and their collaboration in the project. Many of the staff were however hired before the arrival of the new project manager without any clear and transparent procedure for their selection. As a consequence the project management had to collaborate with staff, who were not up to their tasks. The management succeeded to terminate at least the contract with the “Livestock Production Specialist” – however not for his apparent lack of professional competence but for embezzlement. If the project management has to identify irregularities in matters of financial administration before the termination of any of the staff contracts it is unlikely to move and progress at the required speed. The project manager has experience in working for other EU-funded projects in West Africa. Staff members were selected applying rigorous procedures, but selection continued even after they started working for the project. As an example: from about 50 employees, who had been working at one stage for the project, only seven were finally retained – without any interference from the donor!

In conclusion:

- The consultant was given poorly written and biased TORs, possibly with a hidden agenda.
- The project was visited at an inappropriate time – largely in the absence of the project manager.
- Any information was taken at face value (“reportedly” = unconfirmed information).
- There was no back-stopping between the consultant and the project management.
- Insufficient time was given for discussions between the consultant and the project manager. Nevertheless a few issues were raised which are however not referred to in the report (in all fairness they could have come with the adjective “reportedly”!).
- The report should therefore not be accepted unless it is cleared from all unsubstantiated assertions.
- It is not entirely clear why the need for the consultancy was “sold” with the justification that it would help FITCA-K during its mid-term evaluation.
- In its present form (this would include the flawed TORs) it is rather likely to raise concerns about conflicting agendas within the inner core of stakeholders.

## **Management Review of FITCA Kenya: Comments by Project Liaison Officer on the Second Draft was not taken into account satisfactorily in the "Final Draft".**

### **1 Implementation with the key stake holders, KETRI & Veterinary Department**

It is difficult to believe that the difficulties in implementing the FITCA (K) Project with KETRI and DVS at the headquarters level is due to lack of correct information and contacts from the project and OAU/IBAR teams. Their indicated lack of faith in the Financing Agreement could have led them to believe that presenting a difficult situation to the project could lead to removal of the project from the present implementing structure. The changes in FITCA (U) that resulted from removal of their project from COCTU to Ministry responsible for Agriculture apparently gave the momentum to this idea that was extended to include a damaging newspaper article. The clear stands taken by the EU and the MoA & RD on the validity of the financing agreement in presence of DDVS from DVS office could have put the situation in order. The report however does not seem to emphasise the MOA & RD PS position that the Ministry had no problem with the financing agreement provided that the impact is felt by the beneficiary, and that if there was, they should have taken up the issue with the donor. This position would solve most of the implementation problems at this level.

### **2 Situation analysis leading conclusion**

The information collected from the various levels of stakeholders needed to be verified. I would have been with the Consultant to be able to explain some of the issues being raised but he did not appeal to some of the stakeholders. The background on which the project operated without the required amount of KETRI-MOA&D HQ support made the lower level staff to work as themselves and not properly representing their bosses. However they knew the community interest would be in jeopardy. Thus they were fully involved in the activities like tsetse control in Teso. The district staff advise the Provincial Administration and politicians making their role too important to be left to operate as themselves. The fact that during the debriefing the EU and Ps clarified the situation the Management of these institutions needs to be advised to give senior and lower officers correct guidance. The project management could have reacted to their negative attitudes in all manners, which will definitely change, with positive attitude from these parties. The Consultant may not take it that the complainants are always right. If they were they would equally highlight the reported beneficiary farmer benefits.

### **3. The Memorandum of Understanding between OAU/IBAR and MOA & RD**

The MOU was a noble idea and would need to be enforced by the signatories. However the advice from the PS that he would be happier with implementation level seminars first and the difficulty on how the MOU with the MOA & RD will prevail on other ministries involved in the project made the idea complicated. The financing agreement could be seen as an MOU in itself binding key parties of the project and the Steering committee is in place regularly to deliberate on the progress of the project. This view needs to be considered by the consultant as he makes recommendations.

#### **4. The structure and the functioning of the PMU/NLO**

FITCA (K) is an OAU/IBAR project and there needs to be some general rules guiding the contracts, regulations, communications etc in line with other OAU/IBAR projects. OAU/IBAR and RDI StockWatch can address most of the issues raised by the PMU as they include reviewing contracts that were agreed on earlier.

It is noted that RDI was not directly in the TOR used by the consultant, yet the Consultancy firm becomes a major recommendation on the consultancy firm. Could the Consultant not have recommended a meeting between the key stake holders to sort out issues as they are bound by contracts rather make conclusion without clear understanding of the contracts? It becomes more complex if the information by some stake holders who have not read the contracts are taken seriously. ?

As the project works with the stake holders in the field at district level the terms of service need to be harmonised with other projects so that one does not bias the performance of other projects at the operational level. Although issue like allowances were raised, they are less a problem than they were earlier. The projects need to sit together and deliberate as they use the same officers to implement their programmes.

Communication in terms of regular reports to the key stakeholders can also be addressed to enable all interested parties to have correct information about the project.

#### **5. Monitoring and Sustainability of FITCA activities**

Without clear guidance from the HQ the field staff see project resources as a substitute for decreasing funding in the public sector. Meetings including the steering committee have emphasised the project as an investment rather than a routine service. The monitoring by the Departments need to go on as they also monitor other projects and their routine activities in the area. Normally the national allocation should increase, as the officers need to monitor the projects keenly. Some situations justify parallel counterpart funds to support sustainability. This however needs positive attitude at HQ level for the involved departments to sustain monitoring the all the project activities in the area, including FITCA. The recommendation could suggest this role for OAU/IBAR to discuss the sustainability issues with MOA & RD.

#### **6 Role of the Private sector**

The clinical services have been privatised and the MOA & RD is clear in this. The private sector is weak in these areas because it needs time to grow and also the good will from the public sector. The conflict at the field level should not be left for the project alone, as the Veterinary Department is a partner in KEVAPS scheme that is promoting private animal health practitioners to get established as they withdraw the government veterinarians from clinical treatments.